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Designing E¢ cient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games
Susan Athey and Ilya Segal￿
This paper studies the problem of allocating a good among two players in each period
of an in￿nite-horizon game. The players￿valuations in each period are private information,
and the valuations change over time. We analyze two special cases for the dynamics of
valuations: ￿serially correlated valuations,￿ where players￿valuations are exogenous but
serially correlated, and ￿learning by doing,￿where a player￿ s past consumption improves his
current distribution of valuations but his valuations are otherwise uncorrelated.
We analyze conditions under which there exists an e¢ cient, Bayesian incentive-compatible
(BIC), individually rational (IR), budget-balanced (BB) mechanism, when the mechanism
designer has commitment power. We consider IR constraints where agents have the option
to (permanently) exit the mechanism in each period. This captures situations where there
are restrictions on the nature of long-term contracts agents can sign, such as at-will employ-
ment contracts, as well as restrictions on posting bonds. In addition, the tools of mechanism
design are often used to model decentralized games, and period-by-period IR constraints
may correspond to the need to deter certain types of deviations in a dynamic game. BB is
a desirable property when there is no individual without private information who can serve
as a source or sink of funds; we may also be interested in e¢ ciency for a particular group of
agents (e.g. colluding ￿rms), so that ￿burning money￿violates e¢ ciency within the group.
In a static setting, Claude d￿ Aspremont and Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet (1979) (AGV)
constructed an e¢ cient, BIC, BB mechanism, in which given prior beliefs, each player receives
the expected value (over opponent types) of opponent utilities. However, in a dynamic
1model, today￿ s reports and allocations in￿ uence opponent prior beliefs in future periods,
and so incentives for truthtelling are undermined.
In a general dynamic model, Susan Athey and Ilya Segal (2006) (AS) construct an e¢ cient
mechanism satisfying BIC and BB, and they provide su¢ cient conditions for IR to hold when
players are very patient and players￿current reports have a vanishing impact on expected
utility in the distant future. Here, we apply their construction to the bilateral trading game,
interpreting the transfers and examining comparative statics. We also analyze IR constraints,
￿nding su¢ cient conditions for IR constraints to hold for moderate patience or when there
is a non-trivial long-run impact of player￿ s reports in a given period.
I. The Model
Time is indexed by t = 1;::;1: There are two players, the ￿buyer￿(b) and the ￿seller￿(s).
Each player i 2 fb;sg has a privately observed valuation for consuming a single indivisible
object in each period (his ￿type￿ in period t), denoted ￿i;t 2 ￿i;t; where ￿i;t ￿ R+ is
￿nite, and we let ￿t = ￿b;t ￿ ￿s;t. We consider several alternative models of the stochastic
process over player types, denoted (~ ￿t)1
t=1, as detailed below. The allocation is denoted
(xb;t;xs;t) 2 f(0;1);(1;0)g. Payo⁄s are xi;t￿i;t + yi;t, where yi;t 2 R is the transfer to player i
in period t:
For a sequence (￿t)1
t=1; we use the notation ￿
t = (￿1;::;￿t) and ￿ = (￿t)1
t=1:
We assume the existence of a mechanism designer who receives reports from the players
in each period (which are publicly observed by both players), and can commit in advance
to a history-contingent allocation and transfer plan. The allocation to player i in period t
is denoted (￿b;t;￿s;t) : ￿t ! f(0;1);(1;0)g; while the transfers, restricted to satisfy budget
balance, are  b;t : ￿t ! R and  s;t = ￿ b;t. The strategy of each player i speci￿es player i￿ s
2reports in all periods t as functions of the history of his true types and all reports. We say
that the strategy is truthtelling if the player reports his true type for all histories.
We consider ￿ex post￿IR constraints within each period: a player can exit after reports
are made but before allocations and transfers are made. For patient players, interim and ex
post IR constraints are similar, so we focus on the more stringent constraint. Once either
player exits, the seller always keeps the object. We require that ex post IR constraints hold
for all possible histories of true types and reports, in order to deter deviations where a player
engages in a series of misreports and plans to exit for some realizations of future types.
II. Serially Correlated Valuations
Suppose that buyer and seller types are serially correlated, but that they are independent
across players and the evolution of types is exogenous to the history of allocations. This
captures the idea that a ￿rm￿ s production technology and capabilities evolve slowly over time.
The types follow a ￿rst-order Markov process (so that today￿ s type distribution depends
only on yesterday￿ s type), and to simplify exposition we assume that the types are a¢ liated
over time. The e¢ cient policy allocates to the highest value player and so can be written
￿￿




denote the expectation of








denotes the expectation over ~ ￿￿j(~ ￿i;t;~ ￿￿i;t￿1) =
(￿i;t;￿￿i;t￿1): Following AS, the transfers are constructed as follows, given a constant K 2 R
that is used to transfer utility between the buyer and seller:


























The buyer￿ s incentive payment (￿b;t) is the di⁄erence between expected discounted seller
3surplus given the buyer￿ s report, and the expected seller surplus given reports in past periods.
The buyer incentive payment is large when serial correlation is high, and when yesterday￿ s
type was high and today￿ s is low. Note that if (in an extension of this model) players observed
only partially informative signals about their valuations prior to the allocation decision in
each period, an increase in the accuracy of the signals would increase the overall variability
of the signals as well as the magnitude of transfers, since each period￿ s information would
have a bigger e⁄ect on expectations about the future.
We show that there exists a truthtelling BNE. Consider BIC for the buyer. Because we
impose BB, the buyer must not wish to misreport in order to manipulate the seller￿ s future
incentive payments; however, the seller￿ s future incentive payments depend on the seller￿ s
beliefs about the buyer, which are in turn functions of today￿ s reports.
First, we show that from the buyer￿ s perspective, the incentive payments for the seller in
each future period ￿ ￿ t, ￿s;￿; have zero expectation no matter what reporting strategy the
buyer uses, provided that the seller uses a truthful strategy. This follows because the seller￿ s
incentive payments give the seller the change in expected buyer utility due to the seller￿ s
current period report, but the buyer￿ s expectation of this change is always zero. Formally,






￿￿ ￿ ￿^ ￿s;t￿1
i
= 0: (1)
For each t and ￿s;t￿1; let
￿
e ~ ￿s;t;~ ￿s;t￿1
￿




















b(e ~ ￿￿)j^ ￿t￿1
i
:
4Since this holds for all possible histories, it must hold when we take expectations given the
buyer￿ s period t beliefs, even if the buyer does not follow a truthful reporting strategy.





correct incentives for the buyer. By the one-stage deviation principle, it su¢ ces to verify that
for any history of reports ^ ￿
t0￿1
and true types for the buyer ￿
t0
b ; the buyer has the incentive
to report truthfully in period t0 when he anticipates truthful reporting in future periods.
Note that ^ ￿b;t0 only enters the ￿rst term of ￿b;t0 and the second term of ￿￿b;t0+1. We proceed








￿ ￿ ^ ￿s;t0￿1
i
: (2)






does not depend on ~ ￿b;t0+1; so that














￿ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿b;t0;e ~ ￿s;t0












￿ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿b;t0;^ ￿s;t0￿1
i￿
; (3)




, yields (2). Since (2) represents
the expected externality of the buyer￿ s report on the seller, we conclude that the anticipa-
tion of future transfers induces the buyer to report truthfully. Notice that this argument
exploits the fact that the ￿rst term of ￿b;t0 and the second term of ￿￿b;t0+1 di⁄er in that the
latter incorporates the arrival of new information about seller types, and the buyer￿ s private
information about past misreports does not a⁄ect his beliefs about the seller￿ s information.
5Now consider IR. Transfers potentially grow without bound as ￿ approaches 1, so that
we cannot necessarily appeal to arbitrary patience to satisfy IR constraints. Which player￿ s
IR constraint is most stringent in period t depends on history. However, the only degree of
freedom the transfers o⁄er in transferring utility across players is a ￿xed constant K (if it
varied with history, it would a⁄ect incentives). Thus, we look for a K that allows IR to be
satis￿ed in the ￿worst-case￿scenario for the buyer, and separately in the worst-case scenario






























￿ ’ = max
￿t;￿b;t￿1
’(￿t;￿b;t￿1); and ’ = min
￿t;￿b;t￿1
’(￿t;￿b;t￿1):
The function ’ is the component of period t￿ s transfer that corresponds to period t payo⁄s,
and ’ and ￿ ’ are the smallest and largest possible values of these. Let ￿ ￿i = maxt max￿i;t,
and ￿i = mint min￿i;t:
Proposition 1 Suppose seller valuations are serially independent. A su¢ cient condition
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￿ ￿ ￿s (4)
































The left-hand side of (4) is the sum of the worst-case buyer utility from consumption and
the worst case of the di⁄erence between the seller utility from consumption and his outside
option. The right-hand side is the sum of worst-case transfers.
6When both players￿types are fully persistent, we essentially have a static model, in which,
by the logic of the theorem of Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite (1983), we know that
IRs in general cannot be satis￿ed (they require continuous types, but the result holds for
many cases of discrete types as well).
With limited persistence, IRs are easier to satisfy. AS show that so long as the type
process has a unique ergodic set (and thus a unique invariant distribution), IR constraints
are satis￿ed in this model for ￿ close enough to 1. Consider two examples with moderate
patience. First, suppose that there are two possible ￿states￿at the start of period t, zt = 0






: Then, (4) becomes
￿
1 ￿ ￿
(p0￿b;b;0 + (1 ￿ p0)￿b;b;1 ￿ (p1￿s;b;0 + (1 ￿ p1)￿s;b;1) ￿ ￿(￿b;b;0 ￿ ￿s;b;1)(p0 ￿ p1) ) (5)
￿ ￿ (1 + p0 ￿ p1)(p0 ￿ p1)(￿s;s;0 ￿ ￿s;s;1) +
￿￿ ￿s + ￿ ’ ￿ ’
￿
(1 ￿ ￿(p0 ￿ p1)):
Notice that so long as the impact of states on distributions is small enough and p0 ￿ p1 is
small enough, the term in parentheses on the left-hand side is positive, and thus the left-hand
side grows without bound as ￿ approaches 1; while the right-hand side remains bounded.
For particular parameter values, we can ￿nd a critical discount factor such that (5) holds.





such that for all ￿b;t 2 [￿
00
b;1]; Prt( ~ ￿b;t+1 = 1j￿b;t) = 1, and for all ￿b;t 2 [0;￿
0
b]; Prt(~ ￿b;t+1 =
0j￿b;t) = 1. The left-hand side of (4) is negative, while the right-hand side is positive. The
inequality will be impossible to satisfy.
We emphasize that (4) is su¢ cient but not necessary. In a model of repeated trade with
serially independent types, Susan Athey and David Miller (2006) show how reallocating
7transfers between states where IR constraints are binding and those where IR constraints
do not bind, while preserving the expected transfers for each player, can reduce the critical
discount factor required for sustaining e¢ cient trade. We conjecture that the qualitative
conclusions about when (4) can be satis￿ed will also apply to the question of whether IR
constraints can be satis￿ed with any transfers.
III. Learning by Doing
Consider the following model of learning by doing. There is a ￿nite set of possible states,
Z ￿ R; with highest and lowest elements ￿ Z and Z. These states represent the stock of
learning: in each period t, ￿nature￿selects period t types using a probability distribution that
depends on the state but not directly on time, and player types are independent conditional
on the state zt: The states evolve according to zt = ￿(zt￿1;xb;t). (To simplify exposition
we restrict attention to deterministic transitions). We assume that higher states imply
weakly higher (by First Order Stochastic Dominance) valuations for the buyer and weakly
lower valuations for the seller, and that ￿ is weakly monotone in zt￿1: This is a Markov
decision problem, and there exists a e¢ cient policy of the Markov form (￿￿
b;￿￿
s) : ￿t ￿ Z !
f(0;1);(1;0)g; which in turn induces a Markov process over states. It is well known that
there exists a ￿Blackwell￿policy, ￿B, that is optimal for all ￿ su¢ ciently high.
In general, the e¢ cient policy may be biased away from the static e¢ cient allocation
depending on the current state. In the special case where zt = xt￿1, the e¢ cient policy
is stationary, since history is irrelevant after types are realized in period t. If, in addition,
the two players are ex ante symmetric and learning by doing is also symmetric, the e¢ cient
policy is just the static e¢ cient policy.
Fix ￿; with e¢ cient policy (￿￿
b;￿￿
s). Let (~ z￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
￿)j~ zt = zt be the random vector equal to the
8state and the type in period ￿ when the state in t is zt and when the e¢ cient policy is used







the expected value of g with respect to (~ z￿
￿;~ ￿
￿
￿)jzt: Transfers in period t are:
 b;t (￿t;zt) = ￿ s;t (￿t;zt) = ￿b;t (￿b;t;zt) ￿ ￿s;t (￿s;t;zt) + K, where K 2 R, and



























































The incentive payment ￿i;t incorporate the change, starting from state zt; to the expec-
tation of player ￿i￿ s discounted payo⁄s that results from player i￿ s period-t report. The
results of AS imply that with these transfers, truthtelling is a BNE. The arguments are sim-
ilar to those in the last section, appropriately modi￿ed to account for the fact that di⁄erent
reporting strategies lead to di⁄erent distributions over future states.
Now consider IR. Each player￿ s incentive payment is large and positive (negative) when
the player￿ s type is lower (higher) than expected, and when period t￿ s allocation can have
(through its e⁄ect on zt+1) a large impact on expected future utility for the opponent. AS
show that the following is su¢ cient for IR constraints to hold for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 1:
Condition M For the Blackwell policy ￿B, the induced Markov process over states has a
unique ergodic set (with a possibily empty set of transient states).
There will be a unique ergodic distribution if, for example, ￿￿(￿) can be either zero or
one with positive probability for all histories, and if ￿ is strictly increasing in xb;t: We now
9consider su¢ cient conditions for IR to be satis￿ed for a ￿xed ￿ or if Condition M fails. De￿ne




























































































































The expressions ’ and ￿ ’ are analogous to those in the serially correlated valuations model,
while ￿i(zt;xb;t) contains all terms in a player￿ s expected utility that depend on patience,
representing the di⁄erence between expected discounted future payo⁄s and the portion of
transfers corresponding to future periods in state zt. The following result provides su¢ cient
conditions for there to exist a K such that the worst-case buyer expected utility is greater
than K and the worst-case seller utility is greater than ￿K:





￿b(zt;xb;t) ￿ ￿ ￿s + ￿ ’ ￿ ’: (6)
When will (6) be satis￿ed? Condition (M) implies that from every initial state, conver-
gence to the ergodic distribution occurs at a geometric rate. For any two states zt;z0
t and
10any xbt;x0

































which would be the gains from e¢ cient trade if there was no e⁄ect of the state: Since
Condition (M) guarantees that the long-run e⁄ect of zt+1 is negligible in expectation, for
high enough patience the sum will be large. On the other hand, under condition (M), the
last two terms of ￿s and ￿b converge to a ￿nite bound as ￿ increases (the long-run impact of
today￿ s decision is negligible; see AS for details).
However, when Condition (M) fails, (6) may not hold. Suppose that there are two ergodic
sets of states. For example, suppose that under the Blackwell policy there is ￿increasing
dominance￿ : once one player gets su¢ ciently far ahead, it is e¢ cient to continue to allocate
to that player often enough to keep him far ahead. Let z￿
t be a critical state where ￿(z￿
t;0) is
in the low ergodic set; while there is positive probability of entering the high ergodic set from
￿(z￿
t;1): Then the last two terms in ￿b(z￿
t;xb;t) grow without bound in ￿. In an extreme case
where the seller￿ s (respectively buyer￿ s) valuations are always above the buyer￿ s (respectively
seller￿ s) in the low (resp. high) ergodic set, the ￿rst term in ￿b(z￿
t;xb;t) is zero, while the
negative terms increase with ￿. (Recall, however, that (6) is su¢ cient but not necessary.)
On the other hand, if the states have only a small impact on the distribution over valu-
ations, then even if we have absorbing states, the su¢ cient conditions can still be satis￿ed.
For example, suppose that ￿( ￿ Z;0) = ￿ Z and ￿(Z;1) = Z; and that players are ex ante sym-




support f0;1g; so that both absorbing states are possible. Even so, ￿i(zt;xb;t) grows without
bound in ￿ so long as for each i, the e⁄ect of the states is su¢ ciently small.
11IV. Conclusions
Dynamic mechanisms contend with more stringent incentive compatibility constraints,
since players can react to information that they learn in the course of the game. E¢ cient,
BB, BIC mechanisms can be constructed by compensating players for the change in expected
opponent utilities due to the report of today￿ s information. We show that IR can be satis￿ed
when the long-run impact of today￿ s information is always small relative to the worst-case
player utilities, since the presence of future surplus that is unrelated to today￿ s reports
induces players to make large transfers and continue with the mechanism.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Recall that we consider IR constraints after any history of reports,
including misrepresentations, since a player might choose to misrepresent for several periods
and then (depending on the realizations of types) exit. However, for the simple model where
types follow a ￿rst-order Markov process, after a buyer sees today￿ s type, the fact that past
reports were di⁄erent than true types is irrelevant, since today￿ s type provides all relevant
















+ (1fi = bg ￿ 1fi = sg) ￿
 




















We simply compare these expressions to the outside option, where the seller keeps the
object in the outside option. This condition combines the implied bounds on K for the
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The condition given in the proposition is su¢ cient for this.
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The expression given in the proposition relies on ￿nding a K such that this expression exceeds
the outside options in the worst-case scenarios.
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